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Preface 
Robert B. Stevens* 
I am flattered to be invited to write this Preface. In the first 
place, the article by Gordon Gee and Donald Jackson is a model 
of serious research and perceptive analysis. I t  uses elegantly the 
historical, the comparative, and the empirical. I t  forces one to 
think, and offers provocative suggestions. All that is remarkable 
is that this laudable comprehensive study of legal education had 
not been undertaken before. 
I suppose I share many of the assumptions or presumptions 
and many of the conclusions of the article. Thus, for me, the 
commentaries in this special issue heighten the value of the Gee- 
Jackson article and thus make a distinctive contribution to the 
ongoing debate about the future of the profession and its training 
and education. The McKay article sets the stage by outlining the 
role of lawyers in America. The Skousen study provocatively ex- 
amines the parallel peregrinations of accountancy and the tenta- 
tive steps being taken towards establishing schools of accoun- 
tancy. The Levin article aggravates the guilt that is the lot of the 
legal educator, while the Finesilver article surveys the various 
structural and intellectual issues facing the profession in terms of 
education, paying particular attention to skills and the clinical 
component. 
This latter theme reflects the main thrust of this special issue 
and makes especially interesting the articles that test the reluc- 
tance of legal education to change, particularly in the light of the 
conflict between conventional forms of teaching and the so-called 
clinical method. Some would see this as the clash between the 
academic and the practical. I think that this simplistic transposi- 
tion is wrong; but historically there is little doubt that clinical 
legal education, however its form is seen, is more related to tradi- 
tional lawyering skills than to traditional scholarly values. 
I t  is scarcely original to note that in the last hundred years 
lawyer training has been taken inside the universities and that a 
considerable element of schizophrenia has developed among that 
peculiar breed of person, the law professor, as to the direction in 
which he or she should move. In the late sixties and early seven- 
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ties, the march toward clinical legal education seemed almost 
irresistible; in the last two or three years the tide has turned, or 
so i t  would seem. The fascinating thing about these articles is 
that  they tell us a great deal-perhaps sometimes inadver- 
tently-about why the tide has turned. The truth is that the 
advocates of clinical legal education-and all of us a t  some level 
are advocates of clinical legal education-have very different 
goals. This set of essays not only provokes, but provides various 
rationalizations of the different trends in clinical legal education. 
These various rationalizations tell us why the time, as academics 
are prone to say, may not be ripe for further penetrations-as 
anthropologists are given to saying-of clinical legal education 
into the academic realm. 
The article by Charles and Jane Kelso says spendidly what 
many thoughtful academics believe: that  change takes place 
slowly in legal education, but there is room for clinical legal edu- 
cation-especially if the Ford Foundation gives us all a lot more 
money. Perhaps such implications are somewhat cynical, but at  
least the Kelso article implicitly asks what would have happened 
if CLEPR had not come into existence or had given no money. 
The answer is that very little would have been done and clinical 
legal education would have gone almost nowhere. In this sense, 
the academic legal profession shares some of the instincts, one 
suspects, of the world's oldest profession. 
On the other hand, there are other insights in the Kelso 
article worth highlighting. The authors' view of clinical legal edu- 
cation is remarkably close to the conventional view of legal educa- 
tion. Over the years, many professors have struggled with the so- 
called problem method. Indeed, which of us has not announced 
the importance of drafting in contract courses? In this sense, we 
can all subscribe to the Llewellyn skills thesis. The Kelsos in 
effect translate clinical legal education into "practice skills edu- 
cation." For them, clinical legal education is, for all practical 
purposes, simulated legal practice. This example of the Indian 
rope trick neatly exhibits, to mix an analogy, what might be 
called the Trojan Horse theory of clinical legal education. "We'll 
take their money; we'll modify the case method a little; and then 
we'll go on making ourselves more scholarly. Perhaps we'll go on 
being professors and being respectable, and invited to sherry with 
professors of classics, and receive those other marks of respect- 
ability in the strange world of academic life." 
Of course, I may be totally misinterpreting what the Kelsos 
are saying. I note, however, that what they are looking for is "a 
facility specially designed for practice skills education" which 
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should provide "housing, specialized equipment, and a trained 
staff' to "facilitate the precise observing and recording of lawyer- 
ing activity" and so on. "The teaching environment may have to 
resemble the real world of practice in many important respects." 
At the same time, they see another vision. The building, no doubt 
with suitable federal or foundation funds, should also have 
the facilities and staff for obtaining up-to-date information on 
the developing factual context in which cases arise and are han- 
dled in the courts or otherwise. There should be systematic fol- 
lowup on cases to evaluate the lawyering, the legal processes, 
and the development of the law. Further, the staff should be 
collecting and processing political and socioeconomic informa- 
tion about the larger context of local, state, national, and inter- 
national communities in which the law is but one of many 
forces. Most importantly, the building should house personnel 
who would subject that information to the full range of "policy 
science" processes explicated by Harold Lasswell and Myres 
McDougal. This policy science is a professional decisionmaking 
process characterized by clarifying goals, discovering trends and 
causal conditions, making projections, and choosing and pursu- 
ing alternatives in light of what is most likely to produce pre- 
ferred outcomes with an optimum expenditure of time and other 
resources. 
While I would not regard that passage as the most gracefully 
phrased paragraph in the English language, it seems to suggest 
that in the Kelso building there will be simulated clients and a 
mass of people "processing." I do not regard "processing" as 
necessarily obscene, and the processing exemplified by Harold 
Lasswell and Myres McDougal has certainly had an important 
impact on us all. I, nevertheless, have a sinister feeling at the 
back of my mind, however, that those professors (I am sure they 
will be called "resource persons" for the purpose of the proposal 
to CLEPR) -as they are busy "clarifying goals, discovering 
trends and causal conditions, making projections, and choosing 
and pursuing alternatives"-will end up looking and sounding 
suspiciously like the law professor of old. Indeed, those who are 
"produc[ing] preferred outcomes with an optimum expenditure 
of time and other resources," will, I suspect, bear a striking re- 
semblance to Aaron Director and Richard Posner. 
Of course, using new types of faculty would help; and of 
course teaching students computer techniques is vital. The appli- 
cation of the so-called policy science approach might well add 
intellectual depth to the debate on clinical legal education; but 
it might well end clinical legal education-at least in the way it 
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is understood by David Barnhizer, who would undoubtedly reject 
the Trojan Horse school of clinical legal education. 
Professor Barnhizer adopts, under various guises, what I 
would like to call the "compulsory chapel" approach to clinical 
legal education. Now, I have always admired those colleges which 
have maintained the compulsory chapel system. I certainly bene- 
fited in prep school by listening (involuntarily) twice a day to the 
elegant Elizabethan and Carolingian prose of the Book of Com- 
mon Prayer. (How I detest, from my sceptical perch, those who 
would translate such resonances to the vulgarity of the vulgate.) 
Yet on reflection, I find compulsory chapel faintly inconsist- 
ent-if I may put it mildly-with the concept of the liberal uni- 
versity. Fortunately, like Lord Esher, Professor Barnhizer has few 
doubts. His belief is of the revealed variety. 
Professor Barnhizer starts from the assumption that an 
"elitist concentration on the preservation of entrenched property, 
wealth, and power" characterizes the method and content of legal 
education. No doubt in any legal system, be it Marxist or capital- 
ist, or under the inevitable shading between the two in which 
most developed societies, be they in the East or West, in fact live, 
the legal system represents the established order. In that sense, 
there is a natural support for those in power. Yet are all the law 
schools the champions of the propertied and the powerful? I have 
certainly heard ad nauseam arguments to that effect, and can 
claim no empirical survey that would disprove them; but I won- 
der if our law schools are really as conventional as the good profes- 
sor would have us believe. Are there no professors teaching consti- 
tutional law who are concerned with civil liberties or the rights 
of criminals? Are there no professors teaching contracts who are 
concerned with consumer protection? Are all property teachers 
solely concerned to espouse unquestioningly the rights of 
landlords? 
Of course, I may not share the same political assumptions as 
Professor Barnhizer. While a civil libertarian, I am concerned 
about congestion in the courts and the absence of adequate police 
protection in all parts of the city, including the ghetto. I am 
concerned with protecting the tenants against rapacious land- 
lords; but I am equally concerned that in some cities the protec- 
tion of tenants has gone so far that it is no longer economically 
feasible for persons to build housing for rental. I would not be 
shocked by a solution provided by public housing, but I am un- 
able to accept Professor Barnhizer's proposition that "the super- 
structure of legal education has evolved into a mechanism serving 
a disturbingly restricted portion of American society, while giving 
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short shrift to the interests of the numerical majority." 
Nor can I accept unquestioningly Professor Barnhizer's no- 
tion of the essential homogeneity of the elite corporate bar and 
the traditional law school faculty-institutions whose members 
apparently adhere to the same antimajoritarian value system. In 
Professor Barnhizer's eyes, working for the Supreme Court or for 
a prestigious law firm is counterproductive to producing a good 
teacher. The only hope of producing a good teacher apparently is 
to hire some good soul from the local bar or, better still, from the 
local legal services office. Yet Professor Barnhizer's law professor 
has a challenging role. Not only is he the scholar or intellectual 
hoping to force students to think, but a teacher that must struc- 
ture the "legal experiences the student undergoes" so that "the 
instructor and student can produce the desired learning." Appar- 
ently the training obtained by those fortunate enough not to be 
contaminated by the Supreme Court or prestigious law firms is 
of the behavioristic mode-which enables him or her to assimilate 
the clinical student to the rat in clinical psychology. Tomorrow's 
law student may have cause to remember the complaint of James 
1's yeoman: "New Presbyter is but Old Priest writ Large."' 
In this context, i t  comes as no surprise that Professor Barn- 
hizer himself is an admirer of the "strict" model of clinical legal 
education-the law office in the law school. It is "the best avail- 
able method by which an  affirmative, coherent, and personalized 
system of professional values and responsibility can be created." 
Here we come to the heart of the matter, for it is apparent that 
the kind of professional responsibility that Professor Barnhizer is 
concerned with is responsibility to the poor. He sees law school 
today as  reflecting an "antidemocratic, antisocial, and anti- 
intellectual" elitism which seeks the preservation of "power, pres- 
tige, wealth, and influence." Only the clinical law professor 
stands against the tide. As conceived by Professor Barnhizer, this 
paragon is not unnaturally concerned solely with the poor, for it 
has been revealed to the good professor that "it is in the represen- 
tation of these clients that the deepest insights into the nature of 
society and of one's relationship to it can be found." 
Quite which prophet revealed this intelligence to Professor 
Barnhizer is unclear. He is, however, apparently convinced that 
only poor clients suffer from "abuse of power, bias, and discrimi- 
nation" and experience afflictions arising out of interactions with 
1. J.  MILTON, On the New Forcers of Conscience Under the Long PARLIAMENT, in 
MILTON'S COMPLETE POEMS 38 (rev. ed. F. Patterson 1933) (emphasis in original). 
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"adverse parties and attorneys, judges, police, and court person- 
nel." I am somewhat reluctant to take issue with Professor Barn- 
hizer. At the risk, however, of questioning his higher source of 
wisdom, is it not just conceivable that middle-class clients also 
have trouble with, and suffer frustration caused by, "adverse par- 
ties and attorneys, judges, police, and court personnel?" Was it 
not possible that even the New York Times and the Washington 
Post suffered by the abuses of power during the Nixon 
administration? 
Of course I understand what Professor Barnhizer is trying to 
say. Empirical studies have shown that law students, whether 
radicals or conservatives, go to law school because they are inter- 
ested in power. What Barnhizer assumes is that if they work in 
legal services offices, they will show less interest in power. Is that, 
however, borne out by the facts? What about the contempt by 
many of those legal services for Band-Aid responses? Why the 
obsession to bring test cases? Power hunger exists among those 
who practice poverty law in much the same way as it does among 
those who practice corporate law. Professor Barnhizer's argument 
is that too many of our law students go into corporate practice 
and they ought to be psychologically readjusted in order to appre- 
ciate that the poor have problems as well as the rich; perhaps in 
this way they will become more professionally conscious. Whiffs 
of such dogmaticism-be they from right or left-may spell the 
end of the liberal university as we know it. It is a high price to 
pay for undoing Langdell's work. 
Professor Barnhizer seems to represent the "activist" style of 
law professor described in the Gee-Jackson study: the political 
activist basically contemptuous of traditional scholarship; con- 
vinced that all laws favor the rich, and none the poor; convinced 
that lawyers need to be radicalized to change this deplorable 
social situation; and so on. Such assumptions make it irrelevant 
that lawyering skills could be learned as a lackey of corporate 
clients, for this argument in favor of clinical legal education is 
essentially a political one. I would not wish, however, to end on a 
sour note, for in terms of the historical thrust in favor of clinical 
legal education, Barnhizer's is the most significant contribution, 
and, as in the case of all these comments on the excellent Gee- 
Jackson study, a vital contribution to the ongoing discussion of 
legal education. 
